Globalization and the Competitiveness of Developing Countries

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The objective of this paper is not to either criticize or estimate the elements that drive globalization, but to look at the present competitiveness position of developing countries in the context of the liberalization and globalization world economy, the opportunities and challenges facing them as the outcome of internationalization of their economic activities.

Introduction

Our times are characterised by extraordinarily rapid change; in particular, the dramatic internationalisation or globalisation of economic activity over the last couple of decades, and the profound political and social consequences that flow from this.

The globalization of the world economy is stimulating massive investments by the transnational corporations, which are acting as an engine to produce more jobs and higher profits worldwide A powerful confluence of forces drives globalisation. Some of them reflect government policies, but fundamentally these are forces with a life of their own – forces unleashed by technological change, especially in the fields of transport and communications. The benefits of globalisation are yet to be globally enjoyed, however: living standards are rising steadily in many, but not all countries. While global economic integration is helping to increase prosperity in many transition or developing countries, the challenge remains to prevent the marginalization of those lagging behind.

This paper examines the opportunities and challenges that globalisation may present to developing countries, especially if high and sustainable growth rates are to be achieved.

On the other hand, it examines their level of competitiveness relative to industrialised countries. Developing countries as a whole are not well integrated in the world economy, and on present trends some of them risk becoming even more marginalized. Moreover, the growth performance of developing countries has been

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disappointing, and their gap relative to industrialised countries is widening. Achieving faster and sustainable growth is essential for developing countries for a number of reasons: their populations and labour forces are growing faster than in the developed countries, unemployment is high, social needs are pressing, and traditional sources of growth, which are highly volatile are slowing down. Due to their structural and economic characteristics, developing countries' growth needs to be outward oriented. Thus, they need to implement policy measures that promote integration: policies geared to attracting foreign capital and increasing non-monoculture exports, while absorbing technological progress and upgrading human capital.

The paper is organised as follows: section 1 reviews the economic impact of global economic integration and growth patterns over recent years, the main forces that drive the globalisation and what the global competition bring to consumers. Section 2 examines the impact of competition and globalisation on competitiveness and section 3 by empirical analyses reviews the competitiveness level of developing countries and compares with the developed countries.

1. Globalisation and Growth

The world is becoming smaller and more interconnected. The pace of global economic integration – the widening and intensifying of international linkages in trade, finance and communications – has accelerated in the past decade, underpinned by the liberalisation of economic policies and by technological discoveries that facilitate transport and communication networks. Production and trade have become intertwined: production processes are spread across the globe and most products entering the market are either traded or heavily reliant on traded components. While world production has increased six-fold in the last four decades, trade flows have multiplied fifteen-fold; more jobs are in some way related to trade.

This trend has been accompanied by a dramatic shift in the amount and nature of capital flows to developing countries, with private flows becoming more important relative to official financing. The globalization of the world economy is stimulating massive investments by the transnational corporations, which are acting as engine to produce more jobs and higher profits world-wide. However, poverty and inequality are rising in the developing world. A striking increase in foreign direct investment (FDI) has occurred, and FDI and portfolio investment now constitute the bulk of private flows. Foreign direct investment has joined international trade as the annum, in the wake of the Uruguay Round and other global or regional multilateral trade liberalisation initiatives; transport and communications

costs will continue to decline; economic reforms are liberalising capital flows and encouraging privatisation; and the international economic environment it expected to be more stable (with relatively low real interest rates and inflation), helping outward-oriented countries.

In view of the growing impact of global economic integration, it is useful to highlight some of its more important features. First, globalisation cannot be halted and cannot be ignored. The powerful forces that drive globalisation – linked to technological advances in transport and communications – have a life of their own and are largely independent of governments. Hence, participating in globalisation may not be optional, given the irreversible changes in the external environment. In the age of information technology, it might prove very difficult for a country to isolate itself from the world marketplace.

Second, globalisation implies that some of the old distinctions between international and domestic policies are becoming increasingly irrelevant. With greater reliance on private capital, countries must strive to retain the confidence of international financial markets and attract FDI. Conversely, good policies do pay, as seen in the aftermath of the Mexico crisis, when private capital continued to flow to developing countries with appropriate policies. Meanwhile, there is less margin for governments to conduct policies that ignore external constraints. A typical example is taxation: Tanzi (1995) notes that countries will face limitations when setting tax structures and levels as they become less able to maintain tax differentials on relatively mobile factors of productions. Moreover, as argued by Heller (1997), a more open capital regime that holds the prospects of large and volatile capital flows will generally call for a more conservative fiscal stance and constrain the sustainable fiscal structure.

Third, globalisation is not always painless. Continuing international economic integration and trade liberalisation can have in the short run social and economic costs due to the displacement of workers as protected sectors open up to competition. There is a transition period before other sectors expand, even if in the long run efficiency gains stimulate economic activity and create jobs, more than compensating for the losses. But in the short term there may be winners and losers in most cases.

Globalisation exposes the social fissures between those with the education, skills and mobility to flourish in and unfettered world market – the apparent „winners" – and those without.[1]

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[1] This argument is quite different from the old protectionist fallacy that trade liberalization entails a „race to the bottom", with countries pitted against each other, seeking gains in ill-defined „competitiveness". As Krugman (1996) says, trade liberalization is not a zero-sum game and growth in real incomes depends ultimately on the rate of domestic productivity growth. But opening up can and does contribute to increase domestic productivity growth.

Rodrik (1997) argues that the world economy faces a serious challenge in ensuring that international economic integration does not contribute to domestic social disintegration. In social terms, governments face the task of managing the transition and dealing with the distributional consequences of change.

1.1. Forces Driving Globalisation

• *Upsurge of trade and changing trade linkages.* During 1985 – 1995, supported by the proliferation of multilateral and regional trade initiatives, the ratio of world trade to GDP rose three times faster than in the preceding ten years and twice as fast as in the 1960s (WEO, 1997). Developing countries increased their share of world trade from 23 per cent in 1985 to 29 per cent in 1995; they also deepened and diversified trade linkages: inter-developing countries trade increased from 31 per cent of total developing country trade in 1985 to 37 per cent in 1995. Between 1985 and 1995, the share of manufactured products in developing countries' exports increased from 47 per cent to 83 per cent (World Bank, 1995). A significant share of world trade is intrafirm and stimulated by FDI, as firms seek to reduce costs and tap domestic markets: in 1992, world sales of multinationals amounted to USD 5.3 trillion, compared with world-wide exports of USD 4.6 trillion (USD 1.3 trillion and USD 1 trillion respectively for developing countries). But wide disparities persist: except for Asia and Latin America, integration has been slowing down. In fact, the share of Africa and the oil-producing countries in world trade has fallen dramatically since the mid-1980s.

• *Integration of world capital markets.* Developing countries are becoming increasingly integrated into the global financial system, following the liberalisation of financial markets of recipient and source countries. Many developing countries have removed restrictions on payments for current account transactions, and lifted controls on cross-border financial flows, especially controls on foreign inflows. By end-1995, 35 developing countries had liberalised their capital account. The share of developing countries' trade under current account convertibility has increased from 30 per cent in 1985 to 70 per cent in 1996. The good growth performance of some developing countries has contributed to make emerging markets more attractive to investors from advanced economies wishing to diversify their portfolios.

• *The increased magnitude of the Transnational corporations (TNCs).* The internationalization of companies is a phenomenon increasingly observed not only in developed countries but also in the developing countries. For the first time, three companies from developing countries (Hutchison Whampoa, Petróleos de Venezuela and Cemex) are among the world's 100 largest TNCs. The TNCs currently comprise over

currently comprise over 800 000 foreign affiliates established by some 60 000 parent companies (WIR, 2001). These TNCs play an important role in international production. Of the 100 largest economies in the world, 51 are now global corporations; only 49 are countries. The combined sales of the world's Top 200 corporations are far greater than a quarter of the world's economic activity. The Top 200 corporations' combined sales are bigger than the combined economies of all countries minus the biggest 9; that is they surpass the combined economies of 182 countries (Anderson and Cavanagh, 2000).

• *Increased importance of private flows and FDI.* The global expansion of investment flows is driven by TNCs. Developed countries remain the destination of FDI accounting for more than three-quarters of global inflows. Cross-border mergers and acquisitions remain the main stimulus behind FDI, and these are concentrated in the developed countries. Foreign direct investment in developing countries also rose. However, their share in world FDI flows declined to nearly 19 per cent, compared to the peak of 41 per cent in 1994. The magnitude of private flows now overwhelms official financing. Capital inflows doubled in relation to developing country GDP between 1983 and 1996, with private capital flows rising from an annual 0.5 – 1 per cent of developing countries GDP in 1983 – 1989 to 2 per cent of GDP per annum in 1994 – 1996. Net private capital flows to developing countries (excluding Asian New Industrialized Economies -- NIEs) averaged about USD 150 billion a year over 1993 – 1996 and almost hit USD 200 billion in 1996 – nearly a sixfold increase from the average annual inflow over 1983 – 1989. Unlike in the 1970s and early 1980s, when most capital flows consisted of bank lending, the largest flows in recent years have been equity and portfolio investment. Foreign direct investment posted the largest rise: over 1982 – 2000, FDI seven-fold increase as a share of world GDP, and rose to a record USD 1271 billion in 2000, while the share channelled towards developing countries rose from USD 59.6 billion in 1989 – 1994 as a average to USD 240.2 billion in 2000 (WIR, 2001). Contribution to the rapid growth of FDI to developing countries in recent years has been the adoption of strong outward-oriented policies, including substantial improvements in their investment codes, embodying a shift from sovereign discretion to a free flow of FDI. Foreign direct investment, however, has flowed massively towards only a few developing countries experiencing fast economic growth: during 1990 – 1996, Asian countries received twice as much in per cent of their GDP than African countries. Two thirds of all FDI during the last decade went to just eight developing countries, and half received almost none.

• *Advances in telecommunications and transport.* The main factor behind globalisation has been the increased ease and falling cost of communications – including transportation. The cost of phone calls has fallen by a factor of sixty since

1930; air-passenger miles per capita have increased 15 times in 20 years; and the advent of faxes and a global computer network has brought about what has been dubbed the „end of geography".

• *Changes in the movements of labour.* As the world becomes more intercon-nected, flows of people across national borders have increased – though they remain small – contributing to ease labour bottlenecks and transfer managerial know-how. The largest flows are between developing countries, but flows from developing to industrial countries have accelerated over the past two decades. In the future one can expect pressures for increased migration from developing countries, whereas developed countries will lower their demand for immigrant labour.

Finally, the benefits of globalisation have yet to reach all. The current external environment offers greater opportunities for integration, but countries need to take them. Increased participation in the world economy yields important benefits: it improves resource allocation, towards areas of comparative advantage, enhances efficiency by increasing competition among firms, and induces learning and tech-nology. As a result, a nation's wealth is increased. In a more open and integrated world economy, there are many reasons to expect greater income convergence, with poor countries enjoying faster per capita income growth than rich countries. With open trade and liberal financial markets, poorer countries should be able to benefit from technology spillovers – for instance via imported capital goods – and, in view of the very wide technology gaps that exist, the potential for technological catch-up is great. Furthermore, capital to labour ratios is lower in developing countries: returns to capital should hence be higher and attract inflows, leading to increased productivity and growth. It is surprising, therefore, that there is little evidence of income convergence in recent decades.

The most recent WEO (1997) focuses on the reasons for this striking outcome. The extent to which countries have benefited so far from integration is extremely uneven. While living standards in most countries have gone up in the last thirty years – excluding the NIEs, developing countries as a group more than doubled their real per capita income between 1965 and 1995 – many countries are not realising their potential. Asia was the only major developing region that managed to raise its per capital income towards those of industrial countries. The average per capita income level of African countries fell in relative terms from 14 per cent of the developed countries' level in 1965 to 7 per cent in 1995.

In fact, countries are becoming polarised into high and low income clusters. Over the past thirty years the vast majority of non-oil developing countries – 84 out of 108 – have either stayed in the lowest income quintile or fallen into that quintile from a relatively higher position. There are now fewer middle-income

developing countries, and upward mobility of countries into higher income catego-
ries has become less frequent over time, particularly since the early 1980s. But,
the WEO argues that, although most developing countries are not converging to-
wards the income levels of advanced economies, there are cases where growth
conditions and policies are favourable, and where progress towards convergence
has been achieved in a relatively short time.

What are the sources of growth of these countries, and what policies could
accelerate convergence? Most studies on rapidly-growing countries that use the
conventional growth-accounting framework (based on a production function, i. e.
simple Cobb-Douglas) describe the contribution to growth of capital, labour and
total factor productivity, and generally emphasise the role played by capital accu-
mulation. Policies aimed at raising the rate of investment and savings are thus
seen as playing a crucial role in raising growth.[2] But in order to achieve long-term
growth, the quality of the physical capital accumulated, as well as the existing
human capital, may be even more important than the amount itself. Recent
studies, attempting to identify determinants of factor productivity or technological
progress, present evidence on the influence on growth of education, the absence of
distortions affecting investment decisions, openness, macroeconomic stability, and
freedom from political and civil unrest. In particular, the fastest growing regions
also show the largest advances in integration with the world economy, as
measured by the size of capital inflows and export growth (World Bank, 1996).
No policy by itself can ensure fast growth and, for high growth rates to be secu-
red, a comprehensive reform package with at least moderate success on several
fronts is needed.[3] The rate of convergence depends on all these factors, and on the
gap between the initial and potential income levels. The larger the gap, the faster
the rate of growth.

Growth and increased integration are thus mutually reinforcing. There is
a lesson for countries lagging behind in integration and growth – mostly Arab
countries and Sub-Saharan Africa (Havrylyshyn and Kunzel, 1997). If current
policies are maintained, not only will the large differences in per capita income
with respect to developed countries or faster-growing developing countries persist,
but the gap will continue to widen.

Moreover, several factors – of special relevance to Arab countries – may
aggravate the plight of the countries that fail to integrate over the coming years.

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[2] Levine and Renelt (1992) find that only the share of investment in GDP turns out to have
a positive and robust correlation with growth.

[3] The WEO (1997) concludes that a successful growth strategy should include, at a minimum,
trade openness, macroeconomic stability and limited government intervention. Easterly and Levi-
ne (1995) add political stability and the spillover effect of neighbouring countries' economic per-
formance to this list.

First, the share of primary commodities other than food in world trade is expected to decline, as commodity prices are projected to flatten or decline in real terms – heightening the pressure for adjustment on oil exporters (World Bank, 1996, 1997). Second, the competition in labour-intensive manufactures from low-income countries like China, India and Bangladesh is bound to intensify; in some cases, products from the transition economies will displace exports from other countries in their traditional markets, notably in the EU. Third, new migration patterns will limit the growth of worker remittances of some developing countries. Finally, there are growing constraints on official foreign aid flows. In 1994, official development assistance accounted for a third of net resource flows to low and middle-income countries (excluding transition economies) and two thirds of those channelled to low-income countries. Yet aid flows have been falling in recent years, a trend that is likely to continue against the backdrop of fiscal consolidation in industrial countries, the end of the Cold War, and mounting scepticism about the effectiveness of government assistance. If countries are less able to rely on official flows, they will need to take measures to attract private foreign financing instead.

1.2. Global Competition and Consumer Concerns

The globalization is often discussed as a generalized process and its impact on the economies as a whole, but rarely discussed about its impact on such as the consumers' welfare and so on.

The term *globalization*, which is intimately associated with the process of liberalization, has come to dominate discussion of development, markets, competition, consumer policy and the environment. Driven by technological advances and reduced costs of transport, globalization has led to greater interdependence among countries. Also, the large-scale movement of goods, services, capital, people and information across national boundaries has led to the spread of technology and ideas as well as to the evolution of global values and an elaborate set of global agreements, treaties and norms. On the supply side, perhaps the most obvious indicator of the impact of globalization can be seen in the increasing importance of transnational corporations. On the demand side, the market for goods and services is rapidly becoming borderless and competitiveness is being increasingly determined by diverse factors such as quality, and the ability to innovate, deliver on time and adjust to changingmarket conditions.

Globalization may have positive effects by promoting competition and by widening consumer choice in terms of quality and service. However, it may also be associated with anti-competitive behaviour, or give rise to new forms of such behaviour and be detrimental to consumers' welfare.

There is a growing consensus amongst policy-makers that a precondition for sustainable development is the emergence of well-functioning markets. Until recently, the main emphasis was on the removal of obstacles to market forces, and relatively little attention was paid to social welfare. Whilst in many countries the circumstances of consumers may have improved, the emergence of market economies and the process of economic liberalization have also generated unexpected social problems. The economic reforms implemented from the 1980s onwards in many countries have paid little attention to the consequences of such reforms for consumers.

It is now becoming increasingly accepted that to secure the benefits of global integration while reducing or eliminating its negative impacts, developing countries need both efficient markets and effective governance of commerce. This is especially true of economies that are more open to trade and international capital markets.

The focus of competition law and policy is the market-dominating behaviour of businesses through *inter alia* price fixing or market-sharing cartels, abuses by leading firms and merger control. The main objective is to promote competition as a means of assisting in the creation of markets responsive to consumer signals, and ensuring the efficient allocation of resources in the economy and efficient production with incentives for innovation. This results in the best possible choice of quality, the lowest prices and adequate supplies to consumers, leading to increased consumer welfare. Efficient allocation and utilization of resources also lead to increased competitiveness, resulting in substantial growth and development. There is considerable evidence that competition is an essential ingredient for enhancement and maintenance of competitiveness in the economy.

Standard economic theory also tells us that competitive forces work best and deliver the expected outcomes when there exists a market that is not overridden by distortions. In most developing countries, the conditions for perfect competition are far from being met and the benefits of enhancing economic efficiency do not necessarily always translate into increases in consumer welfare. The relationship between increased competitiveness and development consequently becomes blurred. For example, the consumer welfare and developmental benefits from increased competition resulting from trade and investment liberalization and privatization have been questioned in the light of the experiences of many developing countries.

2. Globalization and Competitiveness

The notion of competitiveness may be viewed at two levels: at the level of the firm and at the level of the economy as a whole. At the level of the firm, competitiveness is described as the ability to produce goods and services of the right quality, at the right price and at the right time. It means meeting customers'

needs more efficiently than other firms. In a liberalizing and globalizing world economy, firms and industry competitiveness demand innovation and flexibility to meet the challenges of constantly changing market conditions. Continuous improvement in product, process, technology and organization has thus become the key to sustained competitiveness in a globalizing economy.

The need to continuously innovate requires a far larger production capacity and substantial knowledge and financial resources, which have implications for the optimal scale of enterprises. This poses a serious dilemma for small economies. If their firms have to grow to be competitive, what are the implications for the local economy in terms of size and the potential for monopolistic tendencies to emerge? Does it mean that they become too big in a small economy? In this situation, should firms be encouraged to aggressively seek markets abroad, and if so, is the price of domestic concentration acceptable and will there be a concurrent loss to consumer welfare? If firms are prevented from growing too big or entering into agreements with other firms, do policy-makers and consumers fully understand what benefits they are forgoing (if any)? To what extent does success in achieving international competitiveness result in employment, growth and development? Can the dilemma of market concentration be resolved by focusing on the regional economy rather than the national economy?

In a study containing a major survey of international industrial performance, Porter (1990) found that it is the firms that face strong domestic competition, which perform best in international markets. More recent work by Porter (2000) shows that in Japan only those industries characterized by strong domestic competition remain internationally competitive following the country's recent economic downturn – examples include producers of consumer goods such as cameras, automobiles and audio equipment.

„Competition is an unambiguously good thing in the first-best world of economists. That world assumes large numbers of participants in all markets, no public goods, no externalities, no information asymmetries, no natural monopolies, complete markets, fully rational economic agents, a benevolent court system to enforce contracts, and a benevolent government providing lump sum transfers to achieve any desirable redistribution." (Singh and Dhumale, 1999).[4]

Consumer protection policy, on the other hand, seeks to ensure that the efficiencies and innovation benefits brought about by competition are not retained by producers through misleading and deceptive conduct or unfair practices, but are instead shared with consumers. It provides an important safety net in markets where vigorous competition might tempt some businesses to cut corners to gain an unfair competitive advantage.

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[4] Quoted in UNCTAD (2001).

The level of competition in a market may affect the level of consumer protection required. If a competitive market is seen as delivering choices in terms of prices and quality, regulatory intervention on behalf of consumers may need to be strategically targeted so that there is little, if any, negative impact on the competitive process.

It is important that consumer protection not hinder competition by, for example, imposing excessive compliance costs on businesses, which are likely to be ultimately passed on to consumers.

In some instances, globalization has created or intensified difficulties in the implementation of both competition and consumer protection policies. Particular competition concerns for consumers are in the areas of international cartels, and cross-border mergers and acquisitions. There appears to have been a sharp increase in the extent of global cartel activity, or at least in its detection, in the past few years. This is partly due to the impact of trade liberalization, which may have increased the pressure on firms that have traditionally dominated particular local markets without much international competition to collude with producers in other countries to divide up world markets and to agree on prices and output. Whatever the motives for mergers and acquisitions, this growing phenomenon creates additional burden, in terms of resources, information and enforcement, on national authorities seeking to implement an effective competition and consumer protection policies.

World Bank study has shown that, in 1997, developing countries imported USD 81.1 billion of goods from industries in which price-fixing conspiracies were subsequently discovered. These imports represented 6.7 per cent of total imports to developing countries and 1.2 per cent of the gross domestic product (GDP). They represented an even larger fraction of trade for the poorest developing countries, for which these products represented 8.8 per cent of imports. There may have been several other price-fixing conspiracies, which remained undiscovered.

3. The Empirical Part

In this part, we would like to bring to light the competitiveness position of developing countries in the context of globalisation in the end of 20th century and compare it with developed countries.

In this paper we use only two indicators of competitiveness, because of lack of data reliability for other indicators.

One indicator we use in our paper is the so-called *Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA)*, which is considered as a reasonable indicator that can be used in measuring competitiveness and is calculated as following:

$$RCA = \frac{\dfrac{xi^c}{X^c}}{\dfrac{mi^c}{M^c}} \cdot 100, \quad \text{or} \quad \ln\left(\frac{\dfrac{xi^c}{X^c}}{\dfrac{mi^c}{M^c}}\right) \cdot 100 \qquad (1)$$

where

xi^c – the value of export of commodity i of country -c,

mi^c – the value of import of commodity i of country -c,

X^c – the total value of export of country -c,

M^c – the total value of import of country -c.

The higher the ratio of RCA the greater the observed competitiveness of the country in a particular commodity.

In calculating this indicator we have used 2-digit SITC for 3-years time series. Although we acknowledge that the 3-digit SITC would provide better economic interpretation, that was impossible because of lack of data for the vast majority of countries under consideration.

3.1. The Result

In summary, this analysis is not meant to answer questions like whether or not the process of globalization might lead to increased specialization. Given that developing countries face liberalization, a more relevant question perhaps is: how well can they compete and adjust to a new environment?

The objective thus is to analyse how specialized developing economies are relative to other developed countries at present, how well they might adapt in the future, what determines the level of specialization, and finally in what products developing countries are competitive.

From our analysis it implies that developing countries under consideration tur-ned out to be competitive in four groups of SITC: food and live animals (0 SITC), mineral fuels, lubricant and related materials (3 SITC), chemicals and related products, n. e. s. (5 SITC), manufactured goods classified chiefly by material (6 SITC), and miscella-neous manufactured articles (8 SITC) (see Table 1 and Obadi, 2002).

The results are adequate with the character of economic structures of the developing countries, although many of them, especially some of south-East Asian countries, which had signed a relatively high level of competitiveness in many products like (and in some cases more than) developed countries.

The developed countries were competitive in sophisticated products and other industrial products, which include the following groups of SITC: (0 SITC) food and live animals, (5 SITC) chemicals and related products, n. e. s., (6 SITC) manufactured goods classified chiefly by material, (7 SITC) machinery and transport equipment, and (8 SITC) miscellaneous manufactured articles (see Table 1 and Obadi, 2002).

Table 1

The Indicator of RCA for Selected Developing and Developed Countries in the Year of 1997

	Developed Countries				Developing Countries			
	USA	Belgium	Netherlands	Germany	Argentine	Turkey	India	China
00								
01	321.77		336.59	37.24	634.16	882.05		52.94
02		250.80	173.56	112.13	495.63	0.00		0.00
03	44.29	89.00	129.92	0.00	1411.09	0.00	83.62	44.81
04		0.00	77.82	122.46	3084.05	163.57	0.00	0.00
05	116.51	94.93	137.52	14.61	407.65	2603.11	44.37	39.83
06	0.00	97.43	145.00	n. a.	981.28	1142.65		0.00
07	0.00	93.47	101.13	48.61	69.03	0.00	174.19	0.00
08	0.00	111.00	0.00	0.00		0.00		0.00
09	0.00	0.00	223.31	0.00	143.71	0.00		0.00
11	0.00	138.44	134.03	48.98	188.68	0.00	90.75	59.29
12	0.00	n. a.*	254.38	93.31		330.03	121.25	136.31
21	0.00	n. a.	0.00	0.00		0.00		0.00
22	0.00	n. a.	0.00	0.00	10589.7	0.00		
23	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	132.07	
24	78.66	43.81	0.00	0.00	106.39	0.00	0.00	0.00
25	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		0.00	0.00	0.00
26	0.00	0.00	0.00	92.56	810.70	36.94	0.00	78.86
27	0.00	73.70	0.00	0.00		123.08	0.00	
28	138.54	64.62	65.99	41.97	0.00	30.95	0.00	116.22
29	0.00	38.22	341.38	0.00	0.00		0.00	0.00
32	0.00	93.45	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	
33	15.07	0.00	65.28	14.00	481.11	8.45	72.34	77.20
34	0.00	53.33	0.00	0.00	112.86	0.00	0.00	
35	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		0.00	
41	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		0.00	
42	0.00	0.00	157.16	0.00	0.00	68.36	0.00	0.00
43	0.00	112.78	0.00	0.00	0.00		0.00	
51	126.36	0.00	130.98	118.85	27.30	11.44	164.36	83.00
52	129.77	73.16	124.55	124.14	37.85	30.11	0.00	0.00
53	0.00	46.51	0.00	291.24	43.22	22.54	100.57	88.31
54	0.00	128.71	0.00	0.00	0.00	25.93	0.00	95.60
55	238.04	0.00	93.32	149.05		177.69	94.90	60.09
56	0.00	138.29	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		
57	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00			
58	267.23	0.00	196.43	151.98	32.88	25.19	110.49	96.15
59	301.30	161.49	135.29	182.93	33.56	0.00	68.74	96.78
61	0.00	117.74	0.00	0.00		0.00		89.60
62	104.42	#DIV/0!	71.96	94.33	31.78	185.79	66.49	0.00
63	60.46	91.16	55.32	40.74	0.00			78.81
64	111.04	133.31	81.68	121.14	24.54	40.51	52.08	79.84

Table 1. Continued

65	96.29	80.95	120.17	107.37	53.93	**262.85**	76.41	102.07
66	58.86	160.43	68.69	95.68	43.00	**375.01**	38.77	58.99
67	49.70	103.62	84.01	116.38	151.65	178.57	31.27	71.55
68	65.62	182.84	88.33	77.99	74.94	64.82	80.70	69.41
69	95.46	105.88	84.17	129.84	23.60	113.21	59.15	111.40
71	147.55	73.72	61.91	116.50	32.57	29.65	61.06	82.17
72	185.58	37.01	133.56	**367.74**	7.04	10.66	52.97	84.18
73	100.15	112.16	0.00	**231.24**	0.00	0.00	59.16	92.55
74	156.10	78.19	86.55	214.15	17.77	24.71	65.97	67.23
75	88.57	80.62	83.95	50.92	5.51	0.00	**217.00**	109.54
76	91.37	63.06	61.67	98.28	5.32	73.00	134.51	93.76
77	123.90	102.58	114.35	115.20	8.28	71.81	98.65	88.38
78	65.44	77.15	60.21	168.92	50.66	33.31	57.57	39.61
79	**470.94**	124.24	74.42	104.31	36.21	34.82	25.41	0.00
81	0.00	63.71	0.00	0.00		160.11		136.08
82	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	96.53	0.00	82.27
83	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00				144.87
84	22.45	0.00	98.27	27.63	67.54	**5322.47**	87.47	174.10
85	0.00	61.50	0.00	0.00	0.00			130.83
87	**228.79**	0.00	91.37	150.72	0.00		59.29	100.84
88	68.26	65.43	n. a.	93.53	18.23	0.00	94.13	132.10
89	86.71	150.24	89.57	102.59	28.56	100.65	74.75	176.45
94	n. a.	87.15			0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
95	n. a.				0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
96	n. a.				0.00	0.00	74.71	0.00
97	n. a.				0.00	0.00		0.00

* n. a. = not available.

Source: Own calculation based on data from International Trade Statistics (1998).

4. Intra-Industry Trade Index (Grubel and Lloyd Index)

4.1. Intra-Industry Trade Theory and Competitiveness

The factor-proportions theory as posited by Heckscher and Ohlin reflects trade flows in complementary goods based on the relative availability and intensity of factors in the production process. Trade flows between countries occur in complementary goods, owing to the comparative advantage based on differing factor endowments in a perfectly competitive trading environment. Grubel and Lloyd (1975) first observed and analysed an apparent anomaly: *a high proportion of industrial country trade is a two-way exchange within the same group of goods, presumably with the same factor intensity. This trade, which they labelled intra-industry trade, describes trade in similar, but slightly differentiated products, based on imperfect competition, or*

trade in close substitutes demanded from consumers in different countries who may have distinct tastes or preferences (Oughton, 1997).

Early critics of this analysis argued that intra-industry trade (IIT) was merely a statistical artifact, representing aggregation of Heckscher-Ohlin trade. This implies that if SITC product categories were disaggregated to further levels, all resulting trade would simply reflect original products based on unique factor ratios. This viewpoint has however been countered both theoretically and empirically. Most recently, Bhagwati (1994),[5] starting from the Heckscher-Ohlin model, has considered IIT from a production position as two-way trade in commodities that are similar in factor-intensity. The explanation for this new theory relies on scale economies at the firm level and imperfect competition, as opposed to factor endowments or intensities. Bhagwati demonstrates that it is always possible to find endowments for which 100 per cent of trade is intra-industry trade, so that large shares of IIT may not be contradictory to the factor endowments theory. Furthermore, it can be shown that trade in differing products is in commodities with the same factor intensity, and hence also non-Heckscher-Ohlin trade. As to empirical tests, Gray (1979) demonstrates that whereas calculations of more disaggregated IIT data show decreased values, the IIT phenomenon does not disappear.

Many studies after Grubel and Lloyd have found that the more advanced and developed an economy, the more specialized its trade structure will be.[6] Thus, industrialized countries tend to have greater levels of IIT than developing countries, with a rough continuum where middle-level income countries show IIT levels higher than low-income ones, but below those of industrial countries. Also, successful exporters (East Asia, other Newly Industrialized Countries) exhibit a speedy and substantial increase in the levels of IIT. From this one can make inferences that higher IIT levels reflect a greater ability to compete in a changing trading environment, and large changes in IIT also reflect a flexibility of adapting to competition.

It should be clear that IIT is a result, or effect of increased specialization, not a cause thereof; the underlying determinants of a country's preparedness to compete internationally, and to adapt to changing circumstances are influenced by fiscal and monetary policy, factor markets, investment, and international trade and trade restrictions such as tariffs and quotas. It should however be noted that significant advantages to specialization exist in the context of trade liberalization. In particular, adjustment based on specialization within the same industry may be

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[5] Quoted in Havrylyshyn and Kunzel (1997).

[6] See Havrylyshyn and Civan (1983), Balassa and Bauwens (1988), and Stone and Lee (1995).

less costly than new industrial investment and by reducing the need for labor mobility imposes less social costs. Moreover, increased specialization enhances competitiveness and acts as a catalyst for new innovations, technologies, and growth. These considerations are relevant for policy formulation that aim to minimize social and economic costs in the process of trade liberalization.

One needs to be cautious interpreting the IIT as an indicator of preparedness. On the one hand a high IIT is broadly indicative of a greater flexibility to compete internationally, and hence to be better prepared for trade liberalization. On the other hand, a reverse causation could be argued: liberalization, even only vis-à-vis the EU, can stimulate investment and efficiency improvements, which in turn would be reflected in an increased IIT index. The proposition that trade liberalization generates increased IIT is posited in the literature, though it remains, in fact, unresolved. Globerman and Dean (1990),[7] argue against this proposition by analyzing the Canada – U. S. Free Trade Agreement. They present results of a survey of Canadian firms which concludes that these do not plan to specialize more. Their study also indicates that there appears to be a „topping out" or even reversal of increasing IIT levels, suggesting that product specialization is not an expected outcome of the FTA between the U. S. and Canada. Similarly, Hamilton and Kniest (1990)[8] examine whether a change in the level of protection has consequences for IIT levels in Australia and New Zealand. They find no support for this hypothesis. One must however caution about inferences regarding these studies, as they analyze the effects of liberalization or protectionism of IIT for industrialized countries, where the notion of topping out may be more applicable. Nevertheless, most studies agree that the impact of trade liberalization on IIT is inconclusive.

4.2. Methods of Calculating the Intra-Industry Trade Index

All data used for the calculation of the indices are at the 2-digit Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) level, and are subsequently aggregated. In addition, and for the purpose of obtaining more meaningful results, we utilize primarily import rather than export data as it is more reliable and complete. Inter-industry trade (INTE), that is trade in different products, is defined as:

$$INTE_i = |X_i - M_i| \qquad (2)$$

where

X_i – total exports in product category i.

M_i – total imports in product category i.

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[7] Quoted in Havrylyshyn and Kunzel (1997).

[8] Quoted in Havrylyshyn and Kunzel (1997).

Thus it is clear that intra-industry (IIT) is simply all trade that is not inter-industry, or:

$$IIT_i = \left(X_i + M_i \right) - \left| X_i - M_i \right| \tag{3}$$

Equivalently, we can normalize IIT to get a measure of the share of intra-industry trade for each commodity:

$$IIT_i = \frac{\left[\left(X_i + M_i \right) - \left| X_i - M_i \right| \right]}{\left(X_i + M_i \right)} \tag{4}$$

Hence if there is no intra-industry trade, one of X_i or M_i will be zero so that the IIT index will be zero. Similarly if all trade is intra-industry, $X_i = M_i$ and the IIT index will take a value of 1.

A final issue that must be kept in mind when considering intra-industry trade involves re-exports.

These goods are not part of increased specialization, but are merely flowing through a country. Albeit re-exports for most countries do not account for significant amounts of total intra-industry trade, key may be important for countries that are natural ports or routing ways such as Hong Kong and Singapore, and possibly for some Arab countries.

4.3. Developing Countries

It is important to be aware that, the results of IIT in some cases are biased due to the trade imbalance in some (especially developing) countries. Because the larger the trade imbalance, the larger the net trade, and hence, the smaller the IIT index.

The results of the study suggest that developing countries overall do not have a highly advanced industrial base, with an average IIT index of 0.43 for the year of 1997. This IIT level falls well below those recorded in industrial countries, and in particular the EU, which has an average IIT index of 0.80. However, developing countries does show positive signs of rapidly increasing IIT levels over the last decade.

The hypothesis puts forth that IIT levels are expected to be lower for oil-exporting than for non-oil exporting countries, is not strongly confirmed by our results. The intra-industry trade levels for oil-exporting countries were only marginally lower than those of non-oil exporting countries.

The explanation could be that although it is expected that oil-exporting countries have less incentives to diversify their economies, these countries generate derivative products and industries like chemicals, which tend to show high IIT indices in all countries.

4.4. Developed Countries

No doubt that, almost all advanced economies are competitive and can compete in various commodities, due to their economic structures and high industrial development and specialization. Thus, while it is a one side of our comparing analysis we will don't escape to briefly illustrate the specialisation of these economies.

As it is shown in the table below, the developed countries were competitive in many commodities or sections of SITC particularly food and live animals, chemicals and related products, manufactured goods classified chiefly by material, machinery and transport equipment, and miscellaneous manufactured articles.

T a b l e 2

Intra-industry Trade Index for Selected Developing and Developed Countries in the Year 1997

SITC	Developed Countries								Developing Countries							
	FR	ND	Japan	GR	PORT	AUST	Italy	USA	ARG	Brazil	Chine	Egypt	India	MX	S. A.	THAI
01	0.87	0.41	0	0.61	0	0.98	0.48	0.58	0.27	0.28	0.64	0	0	0	0	0
02	0.63	0.67	n. a.*	0.86	1	0.99	0.49	n. a.	0.34	0	n. a.	0	n. a.	0	0	0
03	0.53	0.81	0	0	0.51	0	0	0.51	0.13	0.41	0.57	0	0	0	0	0.32
04	0.47	0.94	0	0.82	0.23	0.86	0.89	0	0.06	0	n. a.	0.35	0.19	0	0.41	0.26
05	0.78	0.78	0	0.29	0.64	0.53	0.76	0.94	0.39	0.84	0.52	0.91	0.94	0.32	0	0.18
06	0	0.76	n. a.	n. a.	0		n. a.	n. a.	0.18	0	n. a.	0.04	0.04	0	0	0
07	0.65	0.93	0	0.73	0	0.63	0.69	0	0.82	0.08	n. a.	0.13	0	0	0	0
08	n. a.	n. a.	n. a.	n. a.	n. a.	n. a.	n. a.	n. a.	0	0	n. a.	0	0	0	0	0.6
09	0.55	0.57	n. a.	0	0	0	n. a.	0	0.82	n. a.	0	n. a.	n. a.	0	0	0
11	0.32	0.79	0	0.73	0.55	0	0.43	0	0.69	0	0.69	n. a.		0.35	n. a.	
12	0	0.51	0	0.95	n. a.		0	0	0	0	0.91	0	0	n. a.	0	
22	0	0.36	0	0	0		n. a.	0	0.02	0.28	n. a.	0.7	0	0	0	0
24	0.79	0	0	0	0.61	0.75	0	0.75	0.97	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
25	n. a.	n. a.	n. a.	n. a.	n. a.	n. a.	n. a.	n. a.	0	0.29	n. a.	0	n. a.	0		0
26	0	n. a.	0	0.96	0.34	0	0	0	0.22	0.11	0.82	0.94	0.96	0.95	0	0.41
27	0	0	0	0	n. a.	0.95	0	0		0.8	n. a.	0.66	0.88	0.8		0
28	0.41	0.86	0	0.66	0	0.54	0	0.97	0.25	0.99	0	0	0.88	0	0	0
29	0	0.41	0	0	0	0	0.92	0	n. a.	0	0	0	0			
32	0	0	0	n. a.	0	0	0	0	0	n. a.	0.1	0.53	n. a.			
33	0.35	0.85	0.09	0.28	0.38	0.26	0.37	0.21	0.34	0.1	0.81	0.1	0.09	0.32	0	0.34
34	n. a.	n. a.	n. a.	n. a.	n. a.	n. a.	n. a.	n. a.	0.94	0	n. a.	0	0.01	0	0	0
42	n. a.	0.72	n. a.	n. a.	0.93		0.68	n. a.	0	0.67	0	0	0.32	0	0	
51	0.88	0.8	0.81	0.84	0.52	0.99	0.64	0.98	0.43	0.5	0.85	0.04	0.68	0.5	0.32	0.43
52	0.85	0.83	0.68	0.81	0	0.86	0	1	0.55	0.71	0	0.51	0.25	0.95	0.79	0
53	0.96	0	0	0.45	0	0.68	0.87	0	0.6	0.54	0.88	0	0.54	0.47	0	0.35
54	n. a.	n. a.	n. a.	n. a.	n. a.	n. a.	n. a.	n. a.	0.26	0.92	0.3	0.55	0.83	0		
55	0.5	0.97	0	0.73	0.4	0.51	0.96	0.71	0	0.74	0.69	0.89	0	0.88	0	0.73
58	0.93	0.62	0.45	0.72	0.54	0	0.85	0.66	0.5	0.64	0.92	0	0.45	0.47	0.49	0.9
59	0.89	0.79	0.83	0.64	0.7	0.77	0.86	0.6	0.5	0.72	0.92	0.23	1	0.42	0	0.69
61	0	n. a.	n. a.	0	0.53	0.94	0.77	n. a.	0	0.35	0.88	0	0.28	0.63		0.68
62	0.71	0.9	0.34	0.95	0.62	0.95	0.84	0.89	0.48	0.99	0	0	0	0.37	0	0.73
63	0.98	0.77	0	0.65	0.3	0.82	0.97	0.63		0	0.82	0	n. a.	0.91	0	0
64	0.93	0.96	0.97	0.83	0.97	0.61	0.95	0.92	0.39	0.99	0.83	0.05	0.34	0.48	0	0.84
65	0.96	0.85	0.96	0.89	0.92	0.98	0.69	0.85	0.7	0.92	0.95	0.72	0.13	0.79	0	0.75
66	0.94	0.88	0.97	0.94	0.75	0.94	0.46	0.62	0.6	0.9	0.68	0.66	0.8	0.92	0.61	0.85
67	0.89	0.98	0.44	0.85	0.32	0.76	0.96	0.55	0.79	0.36	0.77	0.21	0.87	0.94	0.35	0.25
68	0.83	1		0.58	0.96	0	0.93	0.6	0.67	0.86	0.8	0.76	0.97	0.91	0	0.3

Table 2, Continued

Year																
69	0.97	0.98	0.34	0.79	0.9	0.99	0.49	0.84	0.38	0.76	0.99	0.31	0.64	0.66	0.57	0.56
71	0.92	0.83	0.42	0.85	0.34		0.77	0.94	0.49	0.85	0.84	0	0.55	0.95	0	0.78
72	0.96	0.79	0.33	0.38	0.3	0.62	0.4	0.83	0.13	0.5	0.85	0	0.33	0.32	0	0.16
73	0.88	0	0.22	0.54	0	0.81	0.58	0.87		0.32	0.9	0	0	0	0	0
74	0.92	0.99	0.38	0.57	0.62	0.9	0.51	0.91	0.3	0.59	0.74	0	0.32	0.7	0	0.62
75	0.86	0.98	0.68	0.75	0.19	0.99	0.7	0.81		0.32	0.98	0	0.85	0.65	0	0.62
76	0.96	0.82	0.58	0.93	0.85	0.46	0.73	0.82	0.3	0.91	0		0.6	0.65	0	0.77
77	0.93	0.87	0.54	0.85	0.91	0.97	0.86	0.97	0.15	0.33	0.88	0	0.72	0.93	0	0.82
78	0.84	0.81	0.24	0.67	0.88	0.97	0.9		0.67	0.89	0.52	0.09	0.8	0.69	0.24	0.66
79	0.6	0.92	0.51	0.9	0.89	0.77	0.72	0.43	0.53	0.99	0	0	0	1	0	0.43
81	n. a.	n. a.	n. a.	n. a.	n. a.	n. a.	n. a.	n. a.		n. a.	0.91	0		n. a.	n. a.	0
82	n. a.	n. a.	n. a.	n. a.	n. a.	n. a.	n. a.	n. a.		0.74	0.84	0	n. a.	0.52	0	0
83	n. a.	n. a.	n. a.	n. a.	n. a.	n. a.	n. a.	n. a.	n. a.	0.88	n. a.	0		n. a.	0	0
84	0.66	0.95	0	0.49	0.41		0.53	0.29	0.81	0.36	0.79	0	0	0.75	0	0
85	n. a.	n. a.	n. a.	n. a.	n. a.	n. a.	n. a.	n. a.	0	0.24	0.93	0	0	n. a.	0	0
87	0.81	0.98	n. a.	n. a.	0.62	0.61	0.84	n. a.	0	0.22	0.94	0	0	0.92	0	0.61
88	0.62	0	n. a.	n. a.	0		0.95	n. a.	0	0.61	0.92	0	0	0.8	0	0.89
89	0.89	0.99	n. a.	n. a.	0.47		0.58	n. a.	0.45	0.41	0.78	0.59	0.5	0.71	0	0.83
94		0.83	n. a.	n. a.	0.61		0.66	n. a.	0.35	n. a.	n. a.	n. a.	n. a.	0.68	0	

* n. a. = not available.

The selected *developed countries* are: French (FR), Netherlands (ND), Japan, Germany (GR), Portugal (PORT), Austria (AUST), Italy and USA.

The selected *developing countries* are: Argentine (ARG), Egypt, India, Brazil, China, Mexico (MX), Saudia Arabia (S. A.) and Thailand (THAI).

Source: Own calculation base on data from International Trade Statistics (1998).

Conclusion

From our analysis and if we taking into account other endogenous and exogenous factors, it is worth to conclude the following:

First, globalization offers developing countries the opportunities to create wealth through export-led growth, to expand international trade in goods and services, and to gain access to new ideas, technologies, and institutional designs. But globalization also entails problems and tensions that must be appropriately managed. For one thing, global business cycles can contribute greatly to macroeconomic volatility at the national level. The scope and severity of crises in Mexico (1994 – 1995), Asia (1997), Russia (1998), Brazil (1999) and Argentina (2001) suggests the severity of the financial vulnerability developing countries face nowadays.

With financial markets so highly integrated, problems are transmitted rapidly from one country to another. The rapid transmission of financial shocks changes levels of confidence and affects exchange rates, interest rates, asset prices, and, ultimately, output and employment – with consequent social effects.

Second, Policymakers should also be concerned about how globalization exacerbates job instability and income disparities both within and across countries. Macroeconomic and financial crises, by increasing poverty and social tensions, can be political destabilizing. Development policy agendas in the era of globalization need to

articulate traditional concerns with growth, stability, and social equity with new themes such as transparency and good governance at several levels: national, regional, and global.

Third, globalization can lead to crises due to the importance of external factors, even in countries with sound fundamentals and even in the absence of errors in international capital markets. If a country becomes dependent on foreign capital, sudden shifts in foreign capital flows can create financing difficulties and economic downturns. These shifts do not necessarily depend on a country's fundamentals.

Even though net private capital flows to developing countries increased during the third wave of globalization, by one measure they remained more modest than during the first wave. By 1998 the foreign capital stock was 22 per cent of developing country GDP, roughly double what it had been in the mid-1970s. Some countries receive large inflows, while other countries receive little.

The effects of foreign investment on market structure are complex. Blomstrom and Kokko (1996) conclude that the balance of the evidence indicates that „transnational corporations (TNCs) are more likely to crowd out local firms in developing countries, leading to higher concentration ratios on the production side. But they go on to point out that some increase in concentration ratios on the production side may not be a bad thing – particularly if it means there is better exploitation of scale economies".[9]

Regarding competitiveness, developing countries have not a big chance to be competitive under a high liberalizing and globalizing world economy, particularly, when the most important element driving the process of globalization are TNCs.

We think that the developing countries have only to adopt the present situation and adjust to a new environment. On the other hand they have to exploit the potential benefits of their openness and increased competitiveness of their domestic firms. However, to carry out this: developing countries need a good investment climate in which firms can start up and prosper. A good investment climate is particularly important for small and medium enterprises that will create the bulk of new jobs. Elements of a sound investment climate include efficient but treamlined regulations for entry and exit, a healthy financial system, good infrastructure, and good economic governance (contract enforcement, tax administration, safeguards against corruption). Many successfully globalizing developing countries are using the international market for services to strengthen the investment climate. Foreign trade and/or investment can help develop financial services, accounting, telecommunications, power, ports, customs administration, and other critical areas of infrastructure.

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[9] Quoted in Heller (1997).

The hypothesis put forth that IIT levels are expected to be lower for oil-exporting than for non-oil exporting countries, is not strongly confirmed by the results. Intra-industry trade levels for oil-exporting countries were only marginally lower than those of non-oil exporting countries.

The explanation could be that although it is expected that oil-exporting countries have less incentives to diversify their economies, these countries generate derivative products and industries like chemicals, which tend to show high IIT indices in all countries.

The findings of the cross-country econometric analysis of IIT determinants confirms the hypothesis that IIT levels for developing countries fall well below those of developed countries. Overall, these results imply that if developing countries take measures to increase liberalization and diversify their level of industrial specialization, IIT levels would be much higher. If developing countries can specialize in existing industries through greater IIT, significant economic gains might be expected while at the same time adjustment costs are minimized.

Our results also show that the most advanced degree of specialization and potential for effective competition lies in chemicals, petroleum and petroleum products and manufactured goods classified chiefly by material. However, specific commodities in the other manufacturing categories have reached equally high levels of specialization, compared to that of developed countries. These products include a variety of items in basic manufactures, leather articles, and metals. Furthermore, significant increases have occurred in IIT levels for many basic manufactures and machinery products. The high levels and advances in IIT levels for many manufacturing products shows that developed countries can compete effectively in these type of commodities.

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GLOBALIZÁCIA A KONKURENCIESCHOPNOSŤ ROZVOJOVÝCH KRAJÍN

Obadi SALEH MOTHANA

Predložený príspevok skúma globalizáciu ako proces, a zároveň aj možnosti a ťažkosti, ktoré rozvojovým krajinám môže priniesť. Jeho cieľom je odhaliť vplyv internacionalizácie na ekonomický rast a konkurencieschopnosť. Krátkou komparatívnou analýzou konkurencieschopnosti rozvojových krajín vo vzťahu k rozvinutým krajinám je

príspevok zavŕšený. Táto časť príspevku bola spracovaná v rámci projektu VEGA. SAV. 2/7123/20.

Posledné dve dekády boli charakterizované mnohými rýchlymi zmenami v politickej a sociálnej oblasti, ale najmä v oblasti internacionalizácie či globalizácie ekonomických aktivít. Globalizácia sa stala významným fenoménom posledných dvoch dekád a svet sa tým stal menší a viac pripojený. Tento jav bol odrazom technických a technologických zmien najmä v oblasti transportu a telekomunikácií.

Hlavným hnacím motorom globalizácie sú transnacionálne korporácie, ktorých vplyv na celoplanetárne ekonomické a spoločenské dianie v posledných dvoch dekádach veľmi narastá. Ekonomická sila týchto megakorporácií často prekračuje hospodársku výkonnosť samostatných štátov, ktoré svojou ekonomickou silou určujú pravidlá hry tak, aby chránili partikulárne záujmy nielen v materských, ale aj v hosťujúcich krajinách bez ohľadu na ekonomické a sociálne dôsledky z toho vyplývajúce.

V našom príspevku nie je priestor na to, aby sme rozobrali pozitíva a negatíva transnacionálnych korporácií. Je to len skromná snaha analyzovať úroveň konkurencieschopnosti rozvojových krajín v kontexte globalizácie. Globálna ekonomická integrácia, rozšírenie a intenzifikácia medzinárodnej väzby v obchode, vo financiách a v komunikácii v posledných dekádach veľmi akcelerovali. Produkcia a obchod sú veľmi úzko spojené: kým svetová produkcia sa zvýšila v posledných štyroch dekádach šestnásťnásobne, obchodné toky sa zvýšili pätnásťnásobne.

Tento trend bol sprevádzaný mnohými zmenami aj v oblasti finančných tokov do rozvojových krajín. Toky súkromného kapitálu sa stali významnejšími v porovnaní s oficiálnymi, resp. so štátnymi kapitálovými tokmi.

Výhody globalizácie však nemožno jednoznačne zovšeobecňovať pre všetky krajiny, a to vzhľadom na rozdiely v miere získaných výhod, najmä čo sa týka rozvojových krajín. Životná úroveň rástla, ale nie vo všetkých krajinách. Globálna ekonomická integrácia pomohla zvýšiť prosperitu v rôznych tranzitívnych, ako aj rozvojových ekonomikách. No na strane druhej sa prehlbujú ekonomické krízy v iných rozvojových krajinách.

Podľa Mohameda El-Erianiho [3] globalizáciu nemožno zastaviť, ani ignorovať, okrem toho participácia v nej nie je dobrovoľná vzhľadom na nezvratné zmeny vo vonkajšom prostredí. Avšak globalizácia nie je vždy bezbolestná. Pokračovanie v medzinárodnej ekonomickej integrácii a liberalizácii obchodu môže mať v blízkej budúcnosti sociálne a ekonomické náklady vzhľadom na možné pohyby pracovných síl a otvorenosti konkurencii.

Je pravdepodobné, že pri procese globalizácie vzniknú dve skupiny: tzv. víťazi, resp. ziskoví (*winners*) a stratoví (*losers*). Teda medzi tými, ktorí disponujú vyšším vzdelaním, skúsenosťami a mobilitou, a tými, ktorý tým nedisponujú. Medzi týmito dvoma skupinami sa prejavujú sociálne medzery najmä z krátkodobého hľadiska.

Sily, ktoré poháňajú proces globalizácie, sú každým dňom viditeľnejšie. Spomenieme napríklad: rozmach obchodu, integrácia svetového kapitalového trhu, zvýšenie významu súkromného kapitálu a priameho zahraničného kapitálu, rozvoj telekomunikácií a transportu a zmena v pohybe pracovných síl.

Miery výhod, ktoré krajiny získali z integrácie, sú podľa medzinárodného menového fondu veľmi rozdielne. Avšak životná úroveň väčšiny krajín sa v posledných 30 rokoch zvýšila. Okrem novoindustrializovaných krajín rozvojové krajiny ako celok zdvojnásobili svoj reálny HDP per capita, aj keď mnohé z nich nevyužili svoj ekonomický potenciál.

Globalizácia môže priniesť aj pozitívne efekty, a to zvýšením konkurencie a rozšírením výberu spotrebiteľa týkajúceho sa kvality a služieb. Na druhej strane môže dôjsť k nekonkurenčnému správaniu a v konečnom dôsledku k ohrozeniu blahobytu spotrebiteľa.

V globalizovanej a liberalizovanej svetovej ekonomike firmy a priemyselná konkurencieschopnosť vyžadujú inovácie a flexibilitu, aby mohli prekonať problémy permanentne sa meniacich trhových podmienok a obstáť vo svetovej súťaži.

Neustály rozvoj produktu, technológií a organizácie môžu byť kľúčom k udržaniu konkurencieschopnosti v globalizovanej ekonomike.

Popri teoretickej časti analýzy konkurencieschopnosti je v príspevku aj empirická časť, týkajúca sa komparatívnej analýzy konkurencieschopnosti rozvojových krajín z pohľadu zahraničného obchodu vo vzťahu k rozvinutým krajinám. Táto časť identifikuje na základe ukazovateľov konkurencieschopnosti, ako napríklad RCA a IIT, aj úroveň konkurencieschopnosti skúmaných ekonomík vo svetovej súťaži.

Z tejto analýzy možno dedukovať, že rozvojové krajiny – aj vzhľadom na charakter a štruktúru ich ekonomík – v určitých komoditách niektorých skupín tovarov SITC, napríklad 0, 2, 3, 5 a 8, dosiahli porovnateľnú, ba dokonca v niektorých lepšiu úroveň konkurencieschopnosti ako rozvinuté krajiny. Na druhej strane sa však vo väčšine ostatných komodít, ba aj niektorých spomenutých skupín tovarov SITC, napríklad 0, 5, 6, 7, 8 a 9, prehĺbila priepasť medzi rozvojovými a rozvinutými krajinami.

Konečným a celkovým výsledkom teda je, že rozvojové krajiny zaznamenali slabšiu úroveň konkurencieschopnosti, aj pri zohľadnení citeľného pokroku ekonomiky niektorých, najmä novoindustrializovaných krajín vo vzťahu k rozvinutým krajinám.

Z tejto slabej pozície, v ktorej sa nachádzajú rozvojové krajiny, sa možno dostať, ale len stabilizovaním politickej situácie, vytvorením regionálnych integračných zoskupení, účasťou na procese globalizácie, z ktorého niet úniku, vytvorením priaznivých podmienok na vstup zahraničného kapitálu a podporou malých a stredných podnikov tak, aby mohli byť konkurencieschopné tak na domácich, ako aj na zahraničných trhoch.